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Abstract: This study evaluated factors underlying individual differ-
ences in spontaneous (unsuggested) experiences during hypnosis.
Participants varying in hypnotizability (low, medium, and high) com-
pleted a questionnaire about various dimensions of consciousness they
would expect to experience at the “deepest level of hypnosis” (expec-
tancy), an eyes-closed resting condition (baseline), and their actual
experiences during “neutral hypnosis” (hypnosis). Responses during
hypnosis were characterized by higher scores in dimensions related to
alterations in conscious experience, affect, and imagery, and lower
scores in rationality and agency. Only highs and mediums evinced
increases in altered experience and body image. Across conditions,
highs reported greater alterations in time experience and lower self-
awareness than other groups. Participants overall tended to overesti-
mate the changes they would experience in hypnosis. Baseline and
hypnosis correlated in various dimensions, including affect, arousal,
and internal dialogue. After controlling for baseline scores and hypno-
tizability, expectancies correlated with some dimensions having to do
with alterations in consciousness. In sum, spontaneous experiences
during hypnosis are driven by response expectancies, hypnotizability,
and baseline experiences, which show differential effects.
A discussion by White (1941) on the importance of individuals’
expectations on their responses to hypnosis was the impetus for
important research and theoretical developments (e.g., Kirsch,
1991; Shor, 1971). In recent decades, as part of a broader line of
research on the role of expectations in human behavior and experi-
ence (Kirsch, 1999), various studies have investigated whether
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response expectancies are accurate predictors of behavioral and
experiential responses to hypnotic suggestions, with implications
for the cognitive mechanisms underlying hypnotic responding and
the clinical application of hypnosis (for a review, see Kirsch, 1997).
However, the extent to which expectancies contribute to hypnotic
responses remains in contention (e.g., Benham, Woody, Wilson, &
Nash, 2006), and there has been scant research on the role of expec-
tancies and other individual differences in spontaneous (unsug-
gested) experiences during hypnosis.
RESPONSE EXPECTANCIES IN HYPNOSIS
Two main areas of investigation into expectancies have been devel-
oped in experimental hypnosis research. The first focuses on the effect of
the manipulation of participants’ expectancies for how theywill respond
to hypnotic suggestions on their subsequent behavioral and experiential
responses to them. The manipulations have varied, with an important
one seeking to enhance response expectancies by surreptitiously manip-
ulating environmental stimuli so as to give participants the impression
that they are highly responsive to hypnotic suggestions, under the
assumption that this will translate into an increase in hypnotizability
(responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions). The results have been equivo-
cal, with some studies finding a clear relation between manipulated
expectancies and subsequent behavior and experience, and others not
(e.g., Benham, Bowers, Nash, & Muenchen, 1998; Lynn, Milano, &
Weekes, 1991; Silva & Kirsch, 1987; Simon & Salzberg, 1985; Wickless &
Kirsch, 1989). It may be that manipulations are more effective when they
are consistentwith the participants’ own expectancies (Brown&Krasner,
1969) and are not identified as manipulations (Kirsch, Wickless, &
Moffitt, 1999), but even so, the actual experience of a difficult hypnotic
suggestion such as a negative hallucination may run counter to one’s
expectations (Wagstaff, Toner, & Cole, 2002). Overall, those having low
expectancies of responding successfully to hypnosis have been found to
be more accurate prognosticators than those with higher expectancies
(Spanos, Burnley, & Cross, 1993). Moreover, expectancies have not
accounted for the efficacy of other methods that have successfully aug-
mented hypnotizability and nonhypnotic suggestibility, such as transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (Dienes & Hutton, 2013) and nitrous oxide
(Whalley & Brooks, 2009). Cumulatively, these studies suggest that,
although response expectancies can be manipulated, such changes do
not reliably translate to increases in responsiveness to suggestion.
The second area of investigation on expectancies and hypnotic
responses, and the one most relevant to this article, concerns the impact
of nonmanipulated expectancies. Response set theory maintains that
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expectancies about behaviors and subjective experience activate
responses consistent with them (Kirsch, 1999). In general, response
expectancies have been consistent predictors of later behavioral and
experiential responses to hypnotic suggestions in research (Kirsch,
1999; Meyer & Lynn, 2011) and clinical (Montgomery et al., 2010)
contexts, although the magnitude of the relation has been debated
(e.g., Benham et al., 2006). Spanos and colleagues (1993) described
strong and weak versions of the response expectancy hypothesis: The
former maintains that expectancies may be the sole determinant of
hypnotic responses, whereas the latter proposes that expectancy is but
one of a number of potentially interacting variables influencing hypno-
tic responding. For instance, Spanos et al. (1993) reported that adopting
an active stance toward hypnotic suggestions was an independent
predictor of responsiveness, above and beyond expectancies. More
recent studies have sought to estimate the amount of variance
explained by response expectancies and other variables, such as
a general cognitive ability, rather than presenting expectancies as the
only important predictor (e.g., Benham et al., 2006; Kirsch, 1991).
Multiple studies have found support for the weak version of the
response expectancy hypothesis. For instance, Milling (2009) reported
that expectations explained 25% of the variance in response to an
analgesia suggestion. A structural equation modeling study with
repeated assessments of response expectancies after sets of suggestions
showed a bidirectional effect between expectancies and hypnotic
responses, with each one weakly affecting the other, and a latent trait
underlying responses to behavioral suggestions (hypnotizability) that
accounted for most of the variance (Benham et al., 2006). The latent trait
was a stronger predictor of behavioral responsiveness (coefficients of
.39, .68) than expectancies (coefficients of around .12). As for what this
trait might be, Meyer and Lynn (2011) reported that nonhypnotic sug-
gestibility is an important predictor of hypnotizability above and
beyond response expectancies and contextual factors. Another study
(Green & Lynn, 2010) parsed this proposal further, showing that
a combination of 13 psychometric items relating to absorption, imagi-
native involvement, expectancies, and changes in time perception were
good predictors of behavioral response to hypnotic suggestions.
Little is known as to the provenance of response expectancies, but
they may partly reflect previous experiences outside of the hypnotic
context (Laurence, Beaulieu-Prévost, & de Chéné, 2008), such as
a general predisposition to experience alterations of consciousness
(Cardeña & Terhune, 2014). Laurence et al. (2008, p. 247) reported
that the correlation between expectancies and hypnotizability went
from .42 to .01 when the contribution of nonhypnotic suggestibility,
which they attributed to past experiences, was controlled for. They
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also found that medium and high hypnotizables were better at pre-
dicting subsequent hypnotic responses than low hypnotizables, who
tended to overestimate their responses. Also in agreement with the
proposal that previous experience partly determines expectancies is
the finding that expectancies predict hypnotizability more strongly
when evaluated after, rather than before, the hypnotic induction
(Council, Kirsch, & Hafner, 1986).
A set of studies by Pekala and collaborators provided additional
support for a multifactorial model of hypnotic responses. Pekala,
Kumar, and Hand (1993) reported that preinduction expectancies
accounted for approximately 11% of the variance in hypnotizability,
whereas spontaneous resting state experiences following the induc-
tion accounted for an additional 15%. They also reported, in contrast
to Laurence et al. (2008), that whereas the expectancies of low hypno-
tizables (lows) accurately predicted their hypnotic performance, those
of high hypnotizables (highs) underestimated some alterations in
consciousness. Their preinduction condition, however, might have
conflated expectancies with hypnotic-like experiences, because they
asked participants to close their eyes for 4 minutes and experience
what it would feel like to be hypnotized.
Despite the many studies investigating the role of expectancies in
response to hypnosis, few studies have investigated the impact of
expectancies on spontaneous experiential changes after a hypnotic
induction. In a dissertation, Henry (1985, cited in Kirsch, 1989,
p. 154) found that participants’ expectations about how an induction
would affect various dimensions of consciousness predicted sponta-
neous alterations in consciousness and hypnotizability, but the
details of this study have not been published. That there is
a relation between expectancies and unsuggested experiences is
also supported by a study in which scores on a global measure of
hypnotic depth were predicted by responsiveness to a dream sug-
gestion, spontaneous consciousness alterations, expectancies, and an
eye-catalepsy suggestion (Pekala et al., 2010a, 2010b), an effect that
was subsequently replicated (Pekala et al., 2017; Tomé Pires,
Ludeña, & Lopes Pires, 2015; for a critique, see Terhune &
Cardeña, 2010b). Using an open-ended question about what hypno-
tic virtuosos would experience during their “deepest” hypnotic
state, Cardeña (2005) found mixed results, with descriptions varying
in accuracy as to what participants subsequently experienced during
a neutral hypnotic procedure. Overall, the studies reviewed suggest
that response expectancies relate to spontaneous experiences follow-
ing a hypnotic induction, but the magnitude of this effect is
unknown, as is the extent to which it may vary according to level
of hypnotizability.
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HYPNOTIZABILITY AND SPONTANEOUS HYPNOTIC EXPERIENCES
A generally accepted finding is that individuals differ consistently in
their responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions (McConkey & Barnier,
2004), and this difference is generally stable over time (Piccione,
Hilgard, & Zimbardo, 1989; but see Fassler, Lynn, & Knox, 2008).
Furthermore, as compared with those who are less hypnotizable, the
highs (particularly if they are also more dissociative) report having more
unusual experiences and alterations of consciousness in their daily lives
(Pekala, Kumar, & Marcano, 1995). This propensity to experience altera-
tions in consciousness seems to carry over to the hypnotic context. Some
individuals reliably report alterations in body image, sensations, and the
sense of reality; a disinclination to act; and a sense of compulsion (Pekala
& Kumar, 2007), evenwhen no specific suggestions for these effects have
been administered. There is consistent evidence that these effects covary
with hypnotisability, with highs experiencing the most pronounced
changes in experience (for a review, see Pekala & Kumar, 2007). For
instance, a sample of highs reported that, as compared with a resting
state control condition, a neutral hypnotic procedureminimizing specific
suggestions produced changes in many dimensions of consciousness,
including alterations in body image, time sense, perception, and mean-
ing; a sense of being in an altered state; reduced self-awareness and
rationality; and others (Cardeña, 2005). Similarly, in a series of studies
Pekala, Kumar, and collaborators found that high hypnotizability was
associated with unsuggested changes in consciousness in general
(including body image, time sense, perception, and meaning), a sense
of being in an altered state, and others (Pekala & Kumar, 2007). The few
discrepancies between their results and Cardeña’s (2005; e.g., no differ-
ences in affect or imagery) might be due to methodological differences.
Furthermore, some specific spontaneous alterations of consciousness
during hypnosis have cortical correlates (Cardeña, Jönsson, Terhune, &
Marcusson-Clavertz, 2013). Although we refer to these unsuggested
experiences as spontaneous, it is important to bear in mind that they
occur in a context labeled as hypnosis, which participants may have
been exposed to previously (see also Gandhi & Oakley, 2005).
THE PRESENT STUDY
This study evaluated the roles of expectancies, hypnotizability, and
baseline experiences in spontaneous experiences during neutral hyp-
nosis procedure. The central aim was to test the prediction that
experiences during a neutral hypnosis procedure would be associated
with response expectancies, independent of nonhypnotic baseline
experiences and hypnotizability. We also assessed whether
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expectancies had differential effects on various dimensions of con-
sciousness, and whether the accuracy of response expectancies varied
as a function of hypnotizability.
METHODS
Participants
From an original pool of 186 individuals from Lund University and
the surrounding community tested for hypnotizability (66%
women, MAge = 29.16, SD = 11.00, range = 18–66), 46 participants who
scored high (scores 9–12), medium (5–7), or low (0–3) on the Harvard
Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (HGSHS; Shor & Orne, 1962)
were further evaluated with the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale,
Form C (SHSS:C; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962), and the Brief
Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis, 1975). Among these, 39 participants
continued to score consistently as either high, medium, or low on the
SHSS:C; consented to take part in further research; and did not report
marked distress during the previous week. Two of these 39 individuals
experienced negative emotional responses at the beginning of their ses-
sions, and their participationwas discontinued, and datawere unreliable
for a third one. Thus, the final sample consisted of 36 participants,
compensated with 90 SEK (~9 EUR). The first author acted as the experi-
menter for all parts of the study. The studywas approved by the Swedish
Federal Human Subjects Agency (Etikprövningsnämden).
Materials
The HGSHS (Shor & Orne, 1962) is a group screening measure of
hypnotizability. It consists of a standard relaxation-based hypnotic
induction followed by 12 hypnotic suggestions of increasing difficulty.
Response to each suggestion is retrospectively scored in a binary
fashion; the scale has a scoring range of 0 to 12 and good psychometric
properties (Council, 1999).
The SHSS:C (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) measures hypnotiz-
ability in an individual setting. The scale has the same structure as the
HGSHS but includes more difficult cognitive-perceptual suggestions,
is scored by the hypnotist, and is considered the “gold standard” of
hypnotic assessment (Council, 1999).
The BSI (Derogatis, 1975) is a widely used 53-item questionnaire
that measures general distress using a Likert scale from 0 to 4 for each
item. The BSI scores were not entered as data but used only to screen
out potential participants who reported distress for the week preced-
ing their possible participation in the study.
The Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI; Pekala, 1991) is
a 53-item questionnaire that evaluates different dimensions of conscious
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experience in reference to a preceding resting state interval. It consists of
12 dimensions (and 14 subdimensions): altered experience (body image,
time sense, perception, and meaning), positive affect (joy, sexual excite-
ment, and love), negative affect (anger, sadness, and fear), attention
(direction and absorption), imagery (amount and vividness), self-
awareness, altered state, arousal, rationality, volitional control, memory,
and internal dialogue. Each item consists of opposite statements describ-
ing specific experiences and is scored using a 0-to-6 scale. PCI scores that
did not have acceptable reliability indexes according to the original
author’s norms were not analyzed further. For a review of the use of
this measure in hypnosis research, see Pekala and Kumar (2007).
Procedure
Participants took part in two sessions, sitting in a comfortable chair in
a quiet laboratory. Analyses of data in those two sessions other than those
reported here can be found elsewhere (Cardeña et al., 2013, 2012). The first
session involved the recording of EEG during voluntary versus suggested
arm levitation (Cardeña et al., 2012). Prior to the EEG recording, partici-
pants completed the PCI in reference to what they expected their experi-
ence to be at the “deepest level of hypnosis” (expectancy). They were also
taught a self-report scale of hypnotic depth, which they used in both
sessions. In the second session, after being fitted with an EEG cap, partici-
pantswere in a nonhypnotic baseline condition involving a 2-minute eyes-
closed resting period in which they were asked not to practice meditation
or hypnosis but just to sit quietly and relax. They subsequently completed
the PCI in reference to their experiences during this condition (baseline).
Next, the experimenter administered a neutral hypnosis induction
consisting of a 1-to-30 count with the single suggestion to go into
a deep state of hypnosis throughout the hypnotic procedure. After
the induction, and every 5 minutes for about 30 minutes in total,
participants were prompted to provide a hypnotic depth report and
asked to describe their experiences during the preceding 5-minute
period (Cardeña et al., 2013). Following a deinduction using an alert-
ing 10-to-1 count, participants completed the PCI in reference to their
experienced deepest state during hypnosis (hypnosis).
Analyses
Data were analyzed using two sets of 2 (condition) x 3 (hypnotizabil-
ity) mixed-model ANOVAs. In the first set, the repeated measures inde-
pendent variable condition included two levels (baseline vs. hypnosis),
whereas in the second the levels of condition were different (expectancy
vs. hypnosis). In both sets of analyses, the between-groups independent
variable (hypnotizability) included three levels (low vs. medium vs.
high). Significant main effects and interactions were followed up with
one-way ANOVAs and post hoc Tukey HSD tests. Data that violated the
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assumption of homogeneity of variance were analyzed using one-way
Welch ANOVAs (FW; uncorrected dfs are reported). Because of the large
number of analyses, we used a corrected α level of .01 for both set of
ANOVAs. Zero-order and partial correlationswere conducted to analyze
associations between PCI scores across conditions. A false discovery rate
(FDR; Benjamini & Yekutieli, 2001) correction was applied to the set of
correlations, which amounted to three sets of correlations for each of 26
dimensions (i.e., 78), in order to determine the threshold for statistical
significance, which resulted in a critical α value of .024 (corresponding to
an r of .376 with this sample size).
RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
The sample included 12 lows, 12 mediums, and 12 highs. The groups
did not have uniform gender distributions (there were 10, eight, and six
women among highs, mediums, and lows, respectively), but the differ-
ence was not significant, χ2 (2) = 3.0, p = .22. There was a main effect of
group on age, FW(2, 33) = 6.28, p = .041, with highs being older
(M = 34.42, SD = 10.87) than mediums (M = 25.50, SD = 4.12), t
(22) = 2.66, p = .02, and lows (M = 25.08, SD = 4.91), t(22) = 2.71, p
= .02, who did not differ from one another, t(22) = 0.23, p = .82. Because
including age as a covariate in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
would violate the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes
across the groups, we did not control for it. Furthermore, previous
research has not found that age among adults is an important contri-
butor to responses to hypnotic inductions (Morgan & Hilgard, 1973;
Ronald J. Pekala, personal communication, July 2017).
Phenomenological Differences Between Baseline and Hypnotic Experience
We first examined the impact of neutral hypnosis on resting state
experiences as a function of hypnotizability. Table 1 presents descriptive
and inferential statistics for the effects of condition (baseline vs. hypnosis),
hypnotizability (low vs. medium vs. high), and their interaction. There
were main effects of condition on multiple PCI dimensions, reflecting
higher scores during hypnosis in altered experience and its subdimensions
(body image, time sense, perception, and meaning), joy, imagery (and
amount of), and experiencing an altered state; and lower scores in ration-
ality and volitional control. Many of these effects were large (ηp
2 > .35).
These effects were accompanied by smaller main effects of hypnotiz-
ability on variables related to alterations in consciousness that were
similar in magnitude (ηp
2 range: .24–.31). Across conditions, highs dis-
played greater alterations in time perception (time sense) and lower
self-awareness than mediums and lows, ps < .024, who did not differ
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Table 1
PCI Dimension Scores (M and SD) as a Function of Condition and Hypnotizability
Hypnotizability F (ηp
2
)
PCI
Dimension Low Medium High
Condition
(Baseline or
Expected vs.
Hypnosis) Hypnotizability
Condition ×
Hypnotizability
Altered experience
1.08 0.63 1.59
Baseline (1.07) (0.55) (1.29) 35.38*** (.52) 5.85* (.26) 6.73** (.29)
2.43 2.85 3.47
Expected (1.13) (1.31) (0.79) 8.88* (.21) 7.24** (.31) 2.33 (.11)
1.26 2.56 3.20
Hypnosis (1.03) (1.10) (1.31)
Body Image
1.28 0.94 1.89
Baseline (1.12) (0.79) (1.58) 28.96*** (.47) 4.44 (.21) 6.16* (.27)
2.47 2.70 3.72
Expected (1.64) (1.51) (1.05) 0.43 (.01) 5.26 (.24) 4.26 (.21)
1.50 3.45 3.47
Hypnosis (1.32) (1.30) (1.70)
Time Sense
1.22 0.69 2.14
Baseline (1.64) (1.01) (1.99) 17.91*** (.35) 5.31* (.24) 1.48 (.08)
2.83 3.47 4.25
Expected (1.03) (1.76) (1.06) 9.70** (.23) 6.63** (.29) 0.65 (.04)
1.78 2.36 3.83
Hypnosis (1.46) (1.80) (1.38)
Perception
1.00 0.42 1.31
Baseline (1.51) (0.57) (1.37) 17.59*** (.35) 3.01 (.15) 5.30 (.24)
1.89 2.39 2.67
Expected (1.32) (1.16) (1.01) 0.26 (.01) 5.46* (.25) 1.76 (.10)
0.96 2.72 2.81
Hypnosis (1.42) (1.25) (1.94)
Meaning
0.90 0.50 1.17
Baseline (0.89) (0.75) (1.07) 21.13*** (.39) 3.10 (.16) 4.10 (.20)
(Continued )
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Table 1
(Continued)
Hypnotizability F (ηp
2
)
PCI
Dimension Low Medium High
Condition
(Baseline or
Expected vs.
Hypnosis) Hypnotizability
Condition ×
Hypnotizability
2.50 2.85 3.29
Expected (1.29) (1.35) (1.18) 21.68*** (.40) 3.20 (.16) 1.54 (.09)
1.02 1.96 2.71
Hypnosis (0.95) (1.56) (1.70)
Positive Affect
1.28 0.54 1.49
Baseline (1.16) (0.81) (1.20) 4.31 (.12) 3.38 (.17) 1.23 (.07)
2.22 1.76 2.76
Expected (1.05) (1.09) (0.88) 34.20*** (.51) 3.44 (.17) 0.53 (.03)
1.26 1.06 2.11
Hypnosis (1.21) (1.00) (1.08)
Joy
1.13 0.46 1.88
Baseline (1.09) (0.86) (1.58) 8.73* (.21) 3.93 (.19) 0.14 (.01)
2.46 2.46 2.88
Expected (1.30) (1.21) (1.09) 10.16** (.24) 1.53 (.09) 1.24 (.07)
1.71 1.38 2.63
Hypnosis (1.57) (1.45) (1.67)
Sexual Excitement
0.88 0.33 0.71
Baseline (1.19) (0.89) (1.29) 0.01 (.00) 1.10 (.06) 0.04 (.00)
1.25 0.67 2.33
Expected (1.20) (0.78) (1.29) 12.64** (.28) 4.23 (.20) 3.16 (.16)
0.88 0.25 0.75
Hypnosis (1.43) (0.72) (1.20)
Love
1.83 0.83 1.88
Baseline (1.61) (1.23) (1.35) 2.20 (.06) 3.64 (.18) 3.76 (.19)
2.96 2.17 3.08
Expected (1.12) (1.59) (0.82) 13.59** (.29) 3.32 (.17) 5.73* (.26)
1.19 1.54 3.08
Hypnosis (1.43) (1.53) (1.74)
(Continued )
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Table 1
(Continued)
Hypnotizability F (ηp
2
)
PCI
Dimension Low Medium High
Condition
(Baseline or
Expected vs.
Hypnosis) Hypnotizability
Condition ×
Hypnotizability
Negative Affect
0.61 0.13 0.68
Baseline (0.98) (0.29) (1.36) 6.27 (.16) 1.21 (.07) 1.77 (.10)
1.36 1.27 1.82
Expected (1.26) (0.98) (1.22) 12.51** (.28) 1.48 (.08) 0.05 (.00)
0.59 0.61 1.20
Hypnosis (0.76) (0.58) (1.40)
Anger
0.50 0.04 0.67
Baseline (1.07) (0.14) (1.50) 5.53 (.14) 0.99 (.06) 0.25 (.02)
1.25 0.98 1.79
Expected (1.25) (1.13) (1.32) 1.44 (.04) 1.46 (.08) 0.05 (.00)
0.83 0.75 1.38
Hypnosis (1.11) (1.59) (1.81)
Sadness
0.67 0.29 0.63
Baseline (1.15) (0.86) (1.15) 1.51 (.04) 1.52 (.08) 2.42 (.13)
1.25 2.00 2.00
Expected (1.36) (1.31) (1.46) 12.54** (.28) 1.80 (.10) 1.90 (.10)
0.58 0.25 1.46
Hypnosis (0.87) (0.62) (2.12)
Fear
0.67 0.04 0.75
Baseline (0.96) (0.14) (1.62) 5.74 (.15) 0.54 (.03) 0.45 (.03)
1.58 0.83 1.67
Expected (1.47) (1.13) (1.42) 2.44 (.07) 0.57 (.03) 0.77 (.05)
1.02 0.88 1.17
Hypnosis (1.76) (1.23) (1.90)
Attention
3.90 4.05 3.90
Baseline (0.87) (0.89) (1.22) 0.00 (.00) 1.37 (.08) 1.85 (.10)
(Continued )
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Table 1
(Continued)
Hypnotizability F (ηp
2
)
PCI
Dimension Low Medium High
Condition
(Baseline or
Expected vs.
Hypnosis) Hypnotizability
Condition ×
Hypnotizability
3.88 4.72 4.70
Expected (0.77) (0.68) (0.56) 6.18 (.16) 5.14 (.24) 0.68 (.04)
3.40 3.97 4.50
Hypnosis (1.24) (0.83) (1.35)
Direction
3.92 3.72 3.86
Baseline (0.95) (1.14) (1.29) 0.98 (.03) 0.86 (.05) 1.72 (.09)
3.97 4.89 4.61
Expected (0.90) (0.72) (0.95) 3.76 (.10) 3.48 (.17) 0.39 (.02)
3.47 4.36 4.47
Hypnosis (1.59) (0.93) (1.31)
Absorption
3.88 4.54 3.96
Baseline (0.93) (1.20) (1.51) 2.05 (.06) 1.40 (.08) 3.60 (.18)
3.75 4.46 4.83
Expected (1.25) (0.96) (0.78) 6.13 (.16) 5.12 (.24) 0.95 (.06)
3.29 3.38 4.54
Hypnosis (1.44) (0.91) (1.50)
Imagery
2.69 2.50 2.15
Baseline (1.36) (1.16) (1.28) 22.42*** (.40) 0.10 (.01) 3.79 (.19)
2.88 3.60 3.65
Expected (1.05) (1.29) (1.08) 0.22 (.01) 1.41 (.08) 1.16 (.07)
3.19 3.22 4.02
Hypnosis (1.36) (1.63) (1.56)
Amount
2.38 2.17 1.75
Baseline (1.86) (1.40) (1.53) 32.28*** (.49) 0.22 (.01) 4.48 (.21)
2.71 3.67 3.88
Expected (1.56) (1.27) (1.57) 0.43 (.01) 2.89 (.15) 0.92 (.05)
3.17 3.29 4.38
Hypnosis (1.57) (1.53) (1.51)
(Continued )
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from one another, ps > .92. Highs also reported greater altered
Table 1
(Continued)
Hypnotizability F (ηp
2
)
PCI
Dimension Low Medium High
Condition
(Baseline or
Expected vs.
Hypnosis) Hypnotizability
Condition ×
Hypnotizability
Vividness
3.00 2.83 2.54
Baseline (1.77) (1.30) (1.37) 6.10 (.16) 0.02 (.00) 0.65 (.04)
3.04 3.54 3.42
Expected (1.01) (1.53) (1.10) 0.63 (.02) 0.28 (.02) 0.43 (.03)
3.42 3.42 3.75
Hypnosis (1.33) (1.73) (1.62)
Self-Awareness
4.69 5.17 4.33
Baseline (0.96) (0.50) (1.03) 7.27 (.18) 7.49** (.31) 2.89 (.15)
4.11 3.92 3.25
Expected (0.96) (1.14) (1.39) 1.79 (.05) 5.84* (.26) 0.99 (.06)
4.86 4.17 3.20
Hypnosis (1.27) (1.12) (1.04)
Altered State
1.36 1.31 2.00
Baseline (1.42) (1.27) (1.48) 38.60*** (.54) 4.78 (.22) 4.77 (.22)
3.25 4.56 4.42
Expected (1.22) (1.09) (0.83) 5.62 (.15) 10.31*** (.39) 1.44 (.08)
1.97 4.14 4.19
Hypnosis (1.70) (1.59) (1.42)
Arousal
1.67 1.17 1.33
Baseline (1.35) (0.86) (0.69) 5.61 (.15) 0.88 (.05) 0.17 (.01)
1.88 0.67 1.29
Expected (1.17) (0.69) (1.08) 5.71 (.15) 2.52 (.13) 0.71 (.04)
2.29 1.71 1.67
Hypnosis (1.16) (1.45) (1.75)
Rationality
4.67 4.86 4.33
Baseline (1.36) (1.22) (1.41) 10.44** (.24) 1.22 (.07) 0.87 (.05)
(Continued )
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Table 1
(Continued)
Hypnotizability F (ηp
2
)
PCI
Dimension Low Medium High
Condition
(Baseline or
Expected vs.
Hypnosis) Hypnotizability
Condition ×
Hypnotizability
3.31 3.81 3.44
Expected (1.17) (1.09) (1.51) 0.02 (.00) 0.46 (.03) 1.96 (.11)
4.17 3.31 3.19
Hypnosis (1.52) (1.32) (1.67)
Volitional Control
4.30 4.28 4.08
Baseline (1.31) (1.60) (1.21) 27.28*** (.45) 1.86 (.10) 1.73 (.10)
2.89 2.45 2.56
Expected (1.17) (0.91) (1.06) 0.13 (.00) 3.08 (.16) 1.52 (.09)
3.56 2.47 2.14
Hypnosis (1.57) (1.39) (1.05)
Memory
4.95 5.14 3.86
Baseline (1.14) (0.85) (1.63) 0.24 (.01) 3.52 (.18) 0.34 (.02)
4.49 4.61 3.75
Expected (0.93) (0.47) (1.27) 1.35 (.04) 2.69 (.14) 0.01 (.00)
4.70 4.86 4.03
Hypnosis (1.49) (1.05) (1.36)
Internal Dialogue
1.75 2.42 2.50
Baseline (2.25) (2.31) (2.25) 0.02 (.00) 0.21 (.01) 0.38 (.02)
1.63 2.04 2.04
Expected (1.17) (1.36) (1.36) 0.73 (.02) 0.18 (.01) 0.10 (.01)
2.04 2.38 2.13
Hypnosis (2.40) (2.28) (1.88)
Notes: Dimensions are in bold.
* p < .01, ** p < .005, *** p < .001,
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experience than lows, Tukey HSD p = .005, but did not differ signifi-
cantly from mediums, p = .085, who did not differ from lows, p = .49.
Differences across conditions and groups were further qualified by
two condition × hypnotizability interactions on altered experience and
body image. Subsidiary ANOVAs showed that there were large
increases in both dimensions during hypnosis for highs (altered
Table 2
Correlation Coefficients of PCI (Sub)Dimensions Between Conditions
Baseline ×
hypnosis (r)
Expectancy ×
hypnosis (r)
Expectancy × hypnosis
(rp: covariates: baseline &
hypnotizability)
AE .34 .56 .40*
bi .26 .51** .39*
ts .40 .48** .29
pe .13 .28 .16
mn .39* .60** .53
PA .55** .76*** .66***
jy .50 .59** .51**
se .56** .33 .18
lo .34 .56 .57**
NA .67*** .45* .22
an .41 .24 .09
sd .57** .26 .14
fe .58** .63*** .45
ATT .15 .41* .28
dr .09 .51** .45*
co .13 .31 .18
IM .50 .53** .24
am .39* .35 .15
vi .30 .46* .35
SA .07 .37 .27
AS .27 .49 .37
AR .55** .32 .47*
RA .05 .14 .15
VC .21 .26 .19
ME .40* .48 .33
ID .65*** .48** .19
Notes: AE = altered cxperience, bi = body image, ts = time sense, pe = perception,
mn = meaning, PA = positive affect, jy = joy, se = sexual excitement, lo = love,
NA = negative affect, an = anger, sd = sadness, fe = fear, ATT = attention, dr = direction,
co = concentration, IM = imagery, am = amount, vi = vividness, SA = self-awareness,
AS = altered state, AR = arousal, RA = rationality, VC = voluntary control,
ME = memory, ID = internal dialogue. p-values reflect FDR-corrected p-values.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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experience: F(1,11) = 9.96, p = .009, η2 = .48; body image: highs, F
(1,11) = 7.99, p = .016, η2 = .42), and even larger ones for mediums
(altered experience: F(1,11) = 45.95, p < .001, η2 = .81; body image: F
(1,11) = 30.32, p < .001, η2 = .73), but no significant changes for lows
(altered experience: F(1,11) = 0.62, p = .45, η2 = .05; body image: F
(1,11) = 0.41, p = .54, η2 = .04). Thus, although hypnosis was associated
with various changes across groups, altered experience and changes in
body image were greater only for highs and mediums.
Expectancies vs. Hypnotic Experiences
The next set of analyses examined to what extent expected experi-
ential responses to the hypnotic procedure corresponded to the actual
experiences during hypnosis. As can be seen in Table 1, participants
tended to overestimate their experiential response to hypnosis, with
main effects of condition (expected vs. hypnosis) on altered experience
(and time sense and meaning), positive affect (and joy, sexual excite-
ment, and love), and negative affect (and sadness), with effect sizes of
ηp
2 range: .21–.51. There were also main effects of hypnotizability on
altered experience (and time sense and perception), self-awareness,
and altered state (ηp
2 range: .25–.39). Whereas highs and mediums did
not significantly differ in any of these dimensions (ps > .06), highs
differed from lows in all of them (ps < .02), and mediums and lows
differed in altered state (p = .001) and perception (p = .012; all other
ps >.08). Finally, there was a single condition × hypnotizability inter-
action on love, showing a greater tendency for lows to overestimate
this dimension in hypnosis, F(1,11) = 27.26, p < .001, η2 = .71, relative
to mediums, F(1,11) = 2.57, p = .14, η2 = .19, and highs, F(1,11) = 0.00,
p = 1, η2 = .00. Although this was the only significant interaction, it is
worth noting that, as compared with highs, lows numerically, albeit
nonsignificantly, overestimated their experiential response to hypno-
sis in 23 of 26 PCI (sub)dimensions.
Baseline Experiences and Expectancies as Predictors of Hypnotic Experiences
The final set of analyses considered the extent to which baseline,
expected, and hypnosis scores correlatedwith one another (see Table 2).
Scores in the baseline and hypnosis conditions correlated positively in
various dimensions: time sense, meaning, positive and negative affect
(and most subdimensions), imagery (and amount), arousal, memory,
and internal dialogue. The entire set of correlations ranged from .05 to
.67 (M = .36, 95% CIs: .29, .43). The results suggest that differences in
various dimensions of experience during a neutral hypnosis condition
can be partly predicted (~13% of the variance on average) from baseline
resting state experiences.
PCI scores similarly correlated in the expected and hypnosis con-
ditions in multiple dimensions: altered experience (and all
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subdimensions, except perception), positive and negative affect (and
some subdimensions), attention (and direction), imagery (and vivid-
ness), altered state, memory, and internal dialogue. The set of correla-
tions ranged from .14 to .76 (M = .44, 95% CIs: .38, .49), showing that
participants’ expectancies moderately predicted (~19% of the variance
on average) their experiences during hypnosis.
The final set of analyses examined the impact of baseline experi-
ences and hypnotizability in the relation between expected and hyp-
nosis PCI scores by computing the partial correlations between
expected and hypnosis, controlling for baseline and hypnotizability.
This yielded positive correlations for altered experience (and the sub-
dimensions body image and meaning), positive affect (and joy and
love), fear, direction (of attention), and arousal (range: .11–.68;M = .37,
95% CIs: .31, .42). Correlation coefficient magnitudes declined
by M = .07 (95% CIs: .04, .10), with the most notable being for time
sense, negative affect, imagery, and internal dialogue. Overall, the
results show that what participants expected in relation to their
experiences in hypnosis with respect to alterations in consciousness,
affectivity, attention, and arousal were consistent with what they
actually experienced, even when controlling for baseline experiences
and hypnotizability.
DISCUSSION
This study examined the roles of response expectancies, baseline
experiences, and hypnotizability in the spontaneous experiences dur-
ing a neutral hypnosis procedure. The findings replicate results that
a hypnotic procedure relates to reports of changes in dimensions of
consciousness, including increases in altered experience, affect, and
imagery, and decreases in rational processes. These results were partly
qualified by level of hypnotizability (Cardeña, 2005; Cardeña et al.,
2013; Pekala & Kumar, 2007). Specifically, as compared with baseline,
during hypnosis highs and mediums reported greater altered experi-
ence and changes in body image, whereas the lows did not. Across
conditions, highs reported lower self-awareness and greater altered
time sense than the other two groups and greater altered experience
than the lows, suggesting a general predisposition for the highs to
have alterations of consciousness even outside of a hypnotic context
(Cardeña & Terhune, 2014).
Participants overall tended to overestimate how much the hypnotic
procedure would affect their consciousness and affect. Furthermore,
highs differed from lows in some dimensions of alterations of con-
sciousness and in self-awareness, with mediums and lows differing in
altered state and perception. The only significant interaction showed
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that lows tended to overestimate how much love they would experi-
ence in hypnosis, a result for whichwe do not have a ready explanation.
Multiple dimensions in both baseline and expectancy experiences
correlated moderately to strongly with the experiences during hypno-
sis. The correlations between baseline and hypnosis tended to refer
more to everyday experiences, such as affectivity and memory,
whereas those between expectancies and hypnosis also referred to
alterations of consciousness. Response expectancies for the impact of
hypnosis predicted experiences during hypnosis even after controlling
for baseline and hypnotizability. The results overall suggest that
spontaneous experiences during neutral hypnosis are driven by
a confluence of variables, including a general propensity to experience
alterations of consciousness as well as expectancies regarding one’s
experiential response to a hypnotic procedure, partly informed by
baseline resting state experiences.
Our results support the ego theory of hypnosis of Erika Fromm
(1977), which proposes that enhanced “primary processing” increases
during hypnosis. The results on hypnotizability for highs and med-
iums but not for lows replicate findings of individual differences
regarding the propensity to experience alterations of consciousness
inside or outside of a hypnotic context (Cardeña & Terhune, 2014;
Kumar & Pekala, 1988).
A promising new finding is that highs reported lower self-
awareness across conditions than mediums and lows. This is
a different finding than a general decrease in self-awareness during
states of attentional absorption (Pekala, Wenger, & Levine, 1985),
because it was present across conditions, and highs did not report
significantly greater absorption than the other groups. Nonetheless,
both findings may be related, insofar as the scales for self-awareness
and absorption did not correlate significantly at baseline (r = .04, p
> .8), but correlated negatively during hypnosis (r = −.40, p < .02). The
self-awareness items of the PCI measure reflective consciousness (e.g.,
“I was continually conscious,” “I was very aware of being aware”),
and the finding of less self-awareness among highs has implications
for recent theories of hypnosis. Our results are arguably consistent
with cold control theory (Dienes & Perner, 2007), which proposes that
people who are less aware of the intentions associated with their
actions are more likely to be highly hypnotizable. Similarly, the inte-
grative cognitive theory (Brown & Oakley, 2004) hypothesizes that
a decrease in “high-level attention” (and presumably self-awareness)
relates to hypnotizability.
The low self-awareness of highs may similarly relate to the “classical
suggestion effect” of involuntariness (Weitzenhoffer, 1980; see also
Terhune & Hedman, 2017). Cardeña and Spiegel (1991, p. 104) earlier
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stated that, “because of the diminished competition with other types of
mental occurrences (including self-reflective appraisals), hypnotic sug-
gestions entail greater salience, influence, and perceived involuntari-
ness.” Given their reported lower self-awareness, highs may be more
likely to experience such involuntariness during hypnotic responding
than the other groups (and hypnotizability likely interacts with dissocia-
tivity, see Cardeña & Marcusson-Clavertz, 2016). However, the lower
self-awareness of highs was not predicted by us in advance and needs to
be replicated. It is consistent with Pekala and Kumar’s (2007) finding of
low self-awareness among a subtype of high hypnotizables, the “classic
highs.”
Highs and mediums reported a few more significant alterations
during hypnosis than lows (Kumar & Pekala, 1988), but we suspect
that a study with greater statistical power would have found additional
differences, as suggested by other data from this sample (Cardeña et al.,
2013). Another interesting result was that changes in body image were
more clearly associatedwith hypnosis bymediums, similar towhat was
reported by highs during “medium hypnosis” in another study
(Cardeña, 2005), and to the content analysis of the participants’ in-
session reports in this study (Cardeña et al., 2013). It may be that
highs have a more liminal experience of their bodies in general and
are more prone to altered bodily states even at baseline, so this dimen-
sion is impacted less by an induction than is the case for mediums.
Participants tended to overestimate their experiential response to
the hypnotic procedure. Although nonsignificant, there was a general
tendency for highs to have more accurate expectations than lows,
particularly in (sub)dimensions related to alterations of consciousness,
which the study probably lacked sufficient statistical power to iden-
tify. Notably, this tendency is the opposite of what Pekala et al. (1993)
reported but is consistent with the findings of Laurence et al. (2008)
and with their proposal that past experiences similar to those in
a hypnotic context—for instance, of absorptive states—may inform
the expectancies for a hypnotic condition. This discrepancy with
Pekala et al.’s (1993) finding might be explained by their having tested
participants inexperienced in hypnosis, as compared with ours, who
had had previously experienced hypnosis on at least two occasions.
On the other hand, Pekala et al. (1993) had their volunteers close their
eyes for 4 minutes and imagine they were hypnotized before measur-
ing expectancies, so their lows had some immediate experiences about
how much they might experience hypnosis but without the demand
for introspection as in our study, in which they were asked to provide
depth and experiential reports. The discrepant findings of Pekala et al.
(1993) with those of Laurence et al. (2008) and our data deserve further
attention. Future research, for instance, should study participants of
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varying levels of hypnotizability but naïve to hypnosis and include
control conditions that measure nonhypnotic resting state experiences
without reference to imagination or hypnosis.
Based on the correlational analyses, baseline scores accounted, on aver-
age, for approximately 13% of the variance in scores in the hypnosis
condition. This association was significant for more everyday dimensions
that may persist from a brief rest to a hypnotic experience, such as positive
and negative affect, arousal, and internal dialogue. There were significant
correlations in other processes—including time sense, meaning, imagery,
and memory—suggesting that these dimensions may be somewhat stable
and show heterogeneity during a resting state, a question deserving
further investigation. The finding about time sense is particularly intri-
guing, as changes in time perception are generally posited to accompany
a hypnotic induction (Naish, 2007). Overall, the data suggest that
a moderate proportion of the variance in the spontaneous experiential
response to a neutral hypnotic procedure is attributable to individual
differences in baseline resting state experiences.
On the other hand, expectancies scores accounted for, on average,
approximately 19% of the variance in experiences during neutral
hypnosis, an estimate within the midrange of other studies that have
focused on suggested responses (Milling, 2009; Pekala et al., 1993).
Although some of the correlations were similar to those for baseline
scores predicting hypnosis scores, they differed in other dimensions,
with expectancies tending to be more predictive of phenomena asso-
ciated with alterations in consciousness, such as a general sense of
being in an altered state, and specific alterations in experience. Thus,
the value of expectancies, above and beyond that of baseline, may be
as predictors for alterations in consciousness. This was partly con-
firmed by the partial correlations between expectancies and hypnosis
scores controlling for baseline and hypnnotizability, in which signifi-
cant effects for altered experience and the subdimensions of body
image and meaning remained significant. Understanding the distinc-
tive predictive values of baseline and expectancies has theoretical
import for our understanding of the role and source of expectancies.
Our data support a weak rather than strong version of response set
theory concerning the role of response expectancies in hypnotic spon-
taneous experiences. Response expectancies accounted for a modest
amount of the variance in such experiences, comparable to that
accounted for by baseline experiences. The results, however, provide
some interesting divergences with regard to which experiential
dimensions are more likely to relate to expectancies. Expectancies
were more robust predictors of dimensions commonly associated
with hypnosis, including increased altered experiences and decreased
arousal, and these results are generally consistent with those
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described by Tomé Pires et al. (2015). Our study cannot reveal the
source of the associations between expectancies and the actual experi-
ential responses during hypnosis, which could be a product of general
cultural expectations, participants’ previous experience with hypnosis
testing and similar phenomena, or a combination of these and other
factors.
Interpretation of the study’s results should consider the study’s
limitations. Expectancies were not naïve, as all participants had pre-
viously participated in two hypnotizability sessions that involved stan-
dard relaxation and focusing instructions and suggestions, imagination
instructions, and suggestions to experience physical and cognitive
alterations. Thus, participants’ expectancies were likely informed by
their previous exposure to both spontaneous and suggested hypnotic
phenomena. Future research about spontaneous phenomena in hypno-
sis will benefit from measuring beliefs and expectancies before any
exposure to hypnotic phenomena, using a neutral induction as the
first exposure to hypnosis, and evaluating a similarly phrased induc-
tion but independent of the context of a hypnotic procedure. Another
limitation is that the study ran parallel to EEG recording (Cardeña et al.,
2013), which is not as pleasant or relaxing as simply sitting or lying
down comfortably and may have attenuated participants’ responses.
Moreover, the sample sizes of the different groups are relatively small,
ƒ, and we corrected for multiple analyses, so many of our analyses had
low statistical power. Thus, nonsignificant results should be interpreted
with great caution.
Because of the large number of analyses, we did not evaluate the
covariations among PCI dimensions (Kumar, Pekala, & Cummings,
1996; Terhune & Cardeña, 2010a). Highs were significantly older than
the two other groups, although age has not been found to affect the
response to hypnosis among adults, other than in a study that
reported that women of childbearing age were more hypnotizable
than their counterparts (Morgan & Hilgard, 1973). Also, although
gender did not differ significantly in our study, women predominated
among the highs, as we have found earlier (Cardeña, Kallio, Terhune,
Buratti, & Lööf, 2007), so research with a larger sample size should
assess the potential impact of gender and age.
Our study provides new and specific information about how hyp-
notizability, baseline experiences, and response expectancies impact
spontaneous experiences during neutral hypnosis. Research using
various methods, including qualitative ones, will further clarify the
sources of individuals’ expectancies about their hypnotic response,
their propensities to have alterations of consciousness, and the pro-
cesses through which expectancies change depending on spontaneous
or manipulated beliefs and experiences. Additional research should
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ideally evaluate both intergroup (e.g., hypnotizability) and intragroup
(e.g., different subtypes and processes among highs; cf., Terhune &
Cardeña, 2010a, 2015) differences, as well as measuring expectancies
before and after exposure to hypnotic or other procedures.
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Die Rolle von Antworterwartungen, Baseline-Erfahrungen und
Hypnotisierbarkeit in spontanhypnotischen Erfahrungen
ETZEL CARDEÑA UND DEVIN B. TERHUNE
Abstract: Diese Studie untersuchte Faktoren, die den individuellen
Unterschieden in spontanen (nicht suggerierten) Erfahrungen während
Hypnose zugrundeliegen. Teilnehmer unterschiedlicher Hypnotisierbarkeit
(niedrig, mittel, hoch) füllten einen Fragebogen ihrer Erwartung bezüglich
der Erfahrung auf der „tiefsten Ebene von Hypnose“ (Erwartung), in einem
Ruhezustand mit geschlossenen Augen (Baseline) und ihrer aktuellen
Erfahrungen während einer „neutralen Hypnose“ (Hypnose) aus. Die
Antworten während Hypnose waren durch Zunahme von Änderungen der
bewußten Erfahrungen, Affekt, Bilder und Abnahme in Rationalität und
Handeln charakterisiert. Nur hoch und mittel Hypnotisierbare zeigten eine
Zunahme der veränderten Wahrnehmung und des Körperbildes. Im
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Querschnitt der Bedingungen berichteten hochHypnotisierbare von größeren
Veränderungen bezüglich der Zeitwahrnehmung und von niedrigerer
Selbstwahrnehmung als andere Gruppen. Über alle Gruppen hinweg tendier-
ten Teilnehmer dazu, die Veränderungen, die sie während der Hypnose
erfahren würden, zu überschätzen. Baseline und Hypnose korrelierten in
unterschiedlichen Dimensionen, inklusive alltäglicher Phänomene wie
Affekt, Erregung und interner Dialog. Nach der Kontrolle von Baseline-
Punkten und Hypnotisierbarkeit korrelierten Erwartungen mit einigen
Dimensionen, die mit veränderten Erfahrungen zu tun haben.
Zusammenfassend läßt sich sagen, daß Spontanerfahrungen während
Hypnose von Antworterwartungen, Hypnotisierbarkeit und Baseline-
Erwartungen angetrieben werden, die andere Effekte zeigen.
STEPHANIE RIEGEL, M.D.
Le rôle des attentes en matière de réaction, des expériences de référence et
de la susceptibilité hypnotique dans des expériences hypnotiques
spontanées
ETZEL CARDEÑA ET DEVIN B. TERHUNE
Résumé: Cette étude a permis d’évaluer les facteurs sous-jacents aux
différences individuelles au cours d’expériences spontanées (non
suggérées) pendant l’hypnose. Des participants ayant divers degrés de
susceptibilité hypnotique (faible, moyen ou élevé) ont répondu à un
questionnaire sur les différentes dimensions de la conscience qu’ils
s’attendraient à connaître au « niveau le plus profond de l’hypnose »
(attentes), en état de repos les yeux fermés (mesure de base), et pendant
leur expérience réelle de « l’hypnose neutre » (hypnose proprement dite).
Les réactions des participants durant l’hypnose ont révélé une augmenta-
tion de l’altération de l’expérience consciente, de l’affect et de l’imagerie,
et une diminution de la rationalité et de l’agentivité. Seuls les partici-
pants dont le degré de susceptibilité hypnotique était élevé ou moyen
ont manifesté une altération de l’expérience et de l’image de soi. Dans
l’ensemble, le groupe des participants très susceptibles à l’hypnose ont
déclaré avoir connu une plus grande altération de l’expérience du temps
et une plus faible conscience de soi que les participants des autres
groupes. Globalement, les participants ont eu tendance à surestimer les
changements dont ils feraient l’expérience en état d’hypnose. La mesure
de base et l’état d’hypnose présentaient une corrélation dans diverses
dimensions, notamment dans des phénomènes quotidiens tels que l’af-
fect, l’excitation et le discours interne. Après avoir tenu compte des
scores de référence et de la susceptibilité hypnotique, les attentes mon-
traient une corrélation avec certaines dimensions liées à des expériences
altérées. En somme, les expériences spontanées pendant l’hypnose sont
dictées par l’attente de la réaction, le degré de susceptibilité hypnotique
et les expériences de référence, lesquels montrent des effets différentiels.
JOHANNE RAYNAULT
C. Tr. (STIBC)
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Los Roles de las Expectativas de Respuesta, las Expectativas Basales y la
Hipnotizabilidad en las Experiencias Hipnóticas Espontáneas
ETZEL CARDEÑA Y DEVIN B. TERHUNE
Resumen: Este estudio evaluó los factores subyacentes a las diferencias
individuales de experiencias espontáneas (no sugeridas) durante la hipno-
sis. Participantes con distintos niveles de hipnotizabilidad (baja, media
y alta) completaron un cuestionario sobre varias dimensiones de conciencia
que esperarían experimentar en: (a) los “niveles más profundos de hipno-
sis” (expectativa), (b) una condición de descanso con los ojos cerrados (línea
basal), y sus experiencias reales durante la “hipnosis neutra” (hipnosis). Las
respuestas durante hipnosis se caracterizaron por incrementos en altera-
ciones en experiencia consciente, afecto y visualizaciones, y decrementos
en racionalidad y sentido de agencia. Solamente los altos y medios mos-
traron incrementos en experiencia alterada e imagen corporal. A través de
las distintas condiciones, los altos reportaron mayores alteraciones en la
experiencia temporal y menor autoconciencia en comparación a los otros
grupos. En general, los participantes mostraron una tendencia
a sobreestimar los cambios que experimentarían en hipnosis. La línea
basal y la hipnosis correlacionaron en varias dimensiones, incluyendo
fenómenos cotidianos como afecto, nivel de alerta y diálogo interno.
Después de controlar las puntuaciones basales e hipnotizabilidad, las
expectativas correlacionaron con algunas dimensiones involucradas con
experiencias alteradas. En resumen, las experiencias espontáneas durante
hipnosis están impulsadas por las expectativas de respuesta, hipnotizabil-
idad, y experiencias basales, que muestran efectos diferenciados.
OMAR SÁNCHEZ-ARMÁSS CAPPELLO
Autonomous University of San Luis Potosi, Mexico
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